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Use of the Discovery Rule in Cases of
Alleged Child Sexual Abuse: Does the
Statute of Limitations Ever Run?
Recently there has been an attempt to expand the scope of the
"discovery rule," traditionally used in medical malpractice cases,
to toll the statute of limitations and to allow alleged cases of child
sexual abuse or molestation to be heard. The recent cases herein
discussed have refused, except under a very narrow set of circum-
stances, to expand the discovery rule. The approach taken by these
courts, considering the circumstances and taking into account the
need for a just result, is both responsible and the most reasonable
response to a very difficult situation.
In Tyson v. Tyson1 there was an attempt to extend the discovery
rule to cases that involved child sexual abuse which had allegedly
occurred many years prior to the institution of the action. The
Plaintiff, Nancy Tyson, who was 26 years old at the time the com-
plaint was filed, alleged that her father, Defendant Dwight Robert
Tyson, committed multiple acts of sexual assault upon her from
1960 through 1969 when she was between the ages of 3 and 11.3
The plaintiff alleged that the sexual assaults committed by her
own father caused her to suppress any memory of those acts and
that the memory was only awakened when, in 1983, she entered
into psychological therapy.' The action was brought some eight
years after the plaintiff's 18th birthday.' The plaintiff contended
that the timing of the filing of her complaint would not bar her
claim because the discovery rule would toll the statute of limita-
tions until the plaintiff "using reasonable diligence, would have
discovered the cause of action."6 The basis for this contention was
1. 727 P.2d 226, 107 Wash.2d 72 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 227.
4. Id.
5. Id. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080(2) (1988) provides that, in general, an action for
personal injury must be brought within 3 years of the time the cause of action accrued.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.100(1) (1988) provides that an action for assault and battery must
be brought within 2 years. If the person bringing the action is under the age of 18 years at
the time the cause of action accrues, the statute of limitations is tolled until the person
becomes 18 years old. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.190 (1988). Id.
6. Id. The plaintiff contended that she did not discover her cause of action until years
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that the sexual abuse caused her such great emotional trauma that
she repressed her entire memory of the events.7
The rule established by the Tjson court limiting the circum-
stances where the discovery rule may be applied requires: first,
that this rule should be adopted only when the risk of stale claims
is outweighed by the unfairness of precluding justified causes of
action;8 and second, where there is objective, verifiable evidence of
the original wrongful act and the resulting physical injury.'
The Tyson court's rationale for this two step approach is
clear-the first part of this test attempts to protect against stale
claims and some of the resulting problems caused by the passage of
time.' ° Some of the most significant of these problems include the
unavailability of evidence due to the passage of time, because of
loss or because the evidence's importance was not understood at
the time." An important or critical witness may have died, may
have left the jurisdiction or, more importantly, may be unable to
recall critical details that were fresh in his mind just after the
events occurred. With the passage of time the events of one day
may grow to proportions that far exceed those which actually
occurred.' 2
The rationale for the second requirement of the discovery rule
test is equally clear. The requirement that there be objectively ver-
ifiable evidence of the original wrongful act and the resulting phys-
ical injury 3 prevents blatant attempts to advance a completely
false claim and increases the possibility that the fact finder will be
able to determine the truth despite the passage of time. 4 A spe-
cific example of a situation where such objectively verifiable evi-
dence exists includes the situation where a surgical procedure re-
sults in a type of harm that is not discoverable until many years
after the surgery is performed.15 In Ruth v.. Dight" a medical mal-
after the statute of limitations expired and only after therapy triggered her knowledge of
the abuse and its connection to the emotional problems she was experiencing as an adult.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 228 (citing Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969)).
9. Id. See generally notes 13-23.
10. Ruth 75 Wash.2d at 664-65.
11. Id.
12. Id. 75 Wash.2d at 665.
13. Id. (The court cites three examples of objectively verifiable evidence which in-
clude: surgical procedures, products liability actions and asbestos cases. Id.); See generally
notes 13-23 infra and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. Ruth 75 Wash.2d at 662-63.
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practice action was brought some twenty-two years after the sur-
gery was performed when it was discovered that an abdominal pain
was caused by a sponge left in the patient.17 After the removal of
the sponge during exploratory surgery, the abdominal pain was re-
lieved."i In this case there was no other possible explanation for
the existence of the sponge in the plaintiff's abdomen other than
the negligence of the surgeon some twenty-two years earlier. A sec-
ond example of objectively verifiable evidence includes the case of
Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital."9 Oh ler was a products liability
action where a premature infant was placed in an incubator and
lost his sight as a result of excessive administration of oxygen.20
The court found evidence to establish that the infant had been
placed in the incubator for some sixteen days and given oxygen for
that period.2" Evidence also established that the excessive adminis-
tration of oxygen caused the infant's blindness.22 The Ohler court
found that the blindness suffered by the infant was an objective
manifestation of the resulting injury and thus fulfilled the second
requirement of the discovery rule test.2" A third example includes
products liability cases involving asbestos exposure.24 In Sahlie v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corporation2" the court held that evidence
that the plaintiff had worked around asbestos products for almost
forty years coupled with the diagnosis of asbestosis was evidence
that satisfied the objectively verifiable evidence of the injury test.2"
Less than one year later the case of Raymond v. Ingram
2 7
presented a similar situation. In Raymond an action was brought
by a grandchild against her paternal grandparents for alleged sex-
ual abuse that occurred during her childhood.2" Ms. Raymond al-
leged that between the ages of 4 and 17, Aaron Ingram, with the
knowledge of Hulda Ingram, her paternal grandfather sexually
abused her.29 As a result of this sexual abuse, Ms. Raymond alleg-
16. 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 92 Wash.2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).




24. Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 99 Wash.2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983).
25. Id.
26. Sahlie, 99 Wash. 2d at 551.
27. 737 P.2d 314 (47 Wash. App. 781 (1987).




edly suffered, among other problems, stomach cramps and a sleep
disorder.3 0 Like in Tyson, the plaintiff in Raymond alleged that
the sexual abuse caused her emotional injury that was not appreci-
ated until she entered therapy.31 Unlike Tyson though, Ms. Ray-
mond admitted that "before she had therapy, she remembered the
assaults and realized that as a child she had mental anguish associ-
ated with the sexual abuse." 2 Ms. Raymond also had memories of
the events giving rise to her cause of action and some of the inju-
ries associated with those events prior to entering therapy. These
facts clearly established that the plaintiff, Ms. Raymond, did not
satisfy the first criteria established by the Tyson court, that all of
the relevant facts pertaining to the injury be repressed.3 4 Once the
injury had been discovered and the age of majority reached, the
statute of limitations began to run. 5
In Meires-Post v. Schafer6 the plaintiff alleged that while in
high school she was seduced and had a sexual relationship with the
defendant, a high school teacher. The experience was so traumatic
that it caused her to repress her memories and feelings of the
events so totally that she was unable to pursue her legal reme-
dies.3 7 The plaintiff alleged that between 1970-74, while in high
school, she had a sexual relationship with a high school teacher
which started when she would go over to his house to help him and
his wife, also a high school teacher, correct papers.38 The Schafer
Court adopted a test very similar to that of the Tyson Court to
determine whether or not to apply the discovery rule.3 9 The Scha-
fer Court held that:
the statute of limitations can be tolled under the insanity clause if (a) plain-
tiff can make out a case that she has repressed the memory of the facts
30. Id.
31. Id. at 317.




36. 427 N.W.2d 606, 170 Mich. App. 174 (1988).
37. Id. Under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(8) (1987); MIC STAT. ANN. § 27A.5805(8)
(1987) the period of limitation for actions for injuries to a person is three years. Under MicH
COMp. LAWS § 600.5851(1) (1987); MIcH STAT. ANN. § 26A.5851(1),(1987) "the period of limi-
tation on the claim of a child victim does not begin to run until the child reaches the age of
eighteen. That section also provides that if a person is insane at the time her claim accrues,
she has one year after the disability is removed to bring the action although the applicable
period of limitation has run." Id. at 608.
38. Id. at 607.
39. Id. at 610.
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upon which her claim is predicated, such that she could not have been
aware of the rights she was otherwise bound to know, and (b) there is cor-
roboration for the plaintiff's testimony that the sexual assault occurred.0
Plaintiff entered into evidence letters from three doctors which
unanimously agreed that it was possible for a 30 year old profes-
sional female, otherwise normal, to repress the recollection of a
childhood seduction by a male teacher.41 Based on this evidence,
and the fact that no evidence was introduced to indicate that the
plaintiff had a recollection of these events until she viewed a tele-
vision program on the subject and then sought psychiatric counsel-
ing, the court felt that the first requirement for application of the
discovery rule had been met.42 The difference between this case
and the others already discussed is that the defendant teacher ad-
mitted that the sexual relationship alleged by the plaintiff did oc-
cur at the time she indicated. 3 This obviously fulfills the corrobo-
ration requirement discussed in the second part of the test set
forth in this case; the two parties involved agree that the events in
question occurred."
As a result of this admission by the defendant, the court makes
it clear that they need not decide whether or not any less stringent
standard should be used to determine when the discovery rule can
be applied. 45
In DeRose v. Carswell,4  appellant DeRose alleged that her step-
grandfather, Carswell, sexually abused her from the age of 4 until
she was 11 years old.47 DeRose contended that she was entitled to
an extension of the statute of limitations under the delayed discov-
ery rule because until recently, within the last six months, she did
not understand the causal connection between her emotional inju-
ries and the alleged sexual assaults. 8
The DeRose Court adopted a two part test, almost identical to
the test for application of the discovery rule, which was adopted in
40. Id.
41. Id. at 607-08.
42. Id. at 608.
43. Id. at 607.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368; 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011 (1988), rehg. denied.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 370. Under CA. CIv. PROC. CODE, sec. 340(3) the limitations period for assault
and battery is one year. Under CA. CIv. PROC. CODE, sec. 352(a) the statute is tolled until the
age of eighteen. Id.
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the cases discussed prior to DeRose.4 9 In order to take advantage
of the delayed discovery rule, the appellant in this case had to
show that first, she has not discovered all the facts necessary to
state a cause of action and second, that some type of objectively
verifiable evidence exists to show the events in question occurred.5"
The DeRose court did not have to proceed past the first criteria
because under this set of facts the first criteria could not be met by
the appellant. 1 It was established here that the appellant was
aware of the fact that she had been molested and that she had
incurred injury as a result of those actions.2 It was admitted that
the plaintiff had not repressed her memories of the events in ques-
tion. 3 The only allegation is that the appellant did not know the
causal connection between the sexual molestation and the injuries
that continue today. 4 Citing Raymond, the DeRose court held that
the failure to understand or discover the causal connection be-
tween the sexual abuse and the injury does not satisfy the require-
ments of the delayed discovery rule test.5 The rule is only availa-
ble in situations where all of the relevant facts necessary to state a
cause of action have been repressed, not simply the causal
connection. 6
Unquestionably situations involving alleged sexual abuse of a
child are very serious and difficult ones. On the one hand, if the
alleged event did in fact occur the demand for punishment must be
granted. But if the alleged event did not occur and the action was
instituted for some other purpose, it should be quickly disposed of
in order to minimize the harm which will certainly be suffered by
the accused. The cases discussed herein attempt to address, as well
as can be done, all of the considerations of all of the parties in-
volved. If in fact sexual abuse has occurred, the test will allow an
individual who truly has been unable to assert a legal cause of ac-
tion for a period of time exceeding the statutory limitations period
the opportunity to do so. The test also permits the accused, who
may well be hampered in putting on a defense by the passage of
time, to require the plaintiff to meet a narrow set of requirements
49. Id. at 373.
50. Id.








in order to state a cause of action that will not be barred by the
passage of time. Given the competing interests involved in a case
of this type and the interest of fairness to all of the parties in-
volved the courts' decisions discussed above have come to the only
reasonable conclusion they could have: allowing a claim of this
type to proceed only under a narrow set of circumstances that pro-
tects the accused, as well as, the victim.
Charles J. Duffy III

